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WHY NUDGE? THE POLITICS OF LIBERTARIAN PATERNALISM. By 
Cass R. Sunstein, Yale University Press, 2014. 
 
Cass Sunstein is the leading advocate of “nudges”—small policy 
interventions that yield major impacts because of behavioral quirks in the 
way that people process information. Such interventions form the core of 
Sunstein’s philosophy of “libertarian paternalism,” which seeks to improve 
on individuals’ decisions while preserving their freedom to choose. In Why 
Nudge?, Sunstein forcefully defends libertarian paternalism against John 
Stuart Mill’s famous Harm Principle, which holds that government should 
only coerce a person when it is acting to prevent harm to others. Sunstein 
urges that, unlike more coercive measures, nudges respect subjects’ goals, 
even as they reshape their choices. Using an analogy to voting paradoxes, 
this Review shows that reconciling multiple, inconsistent goals is a 
fundamentally challenging problem that leaves even deliberative 
individuals vulnerable to manipulation through nudges. The fact of 
inconsistent goals means that government regulators who deploy nudges 
select and impose their own objectives, instead of merely advancing the 
goals of the regulated. The analogy also highlights that multimember 
legislative bodies are subject to many of the same quirks as individuals, 
raising questions about the government’s ability to improve on individuals’ 
choices. 
Part I of this Review introduces nudging and summarizes Sunstein’s 
analysis. Part II uses a hypothetical based on voting paradoxes to build 
intuition about seemingly irrational preferences, and ultimately concludes 
that regulators who deploy nudges will inevitably apply their own 
preferences instead of advancing the goals of those who are nudged. Part 
III argues that paternalistic approaches can be offensive even if they are 
implemented without injury to an individual by developing an analogy to 
the concept of enumerated powers. Part IV argues that paternalistic 
approaches can often only be pursued within a troubling institutional 
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I. WHY NUDGE? 
Classical economic models are peopled with unusual beings. The 
“Econs” posited by these models are hyper-rational creatures who absorb 
all available information, discard irrelevant superficialities, process the 
relevant information correctly, and adopt strategies that optimally advance 
their clear and consistent interests.1 In recent decades, psychologists and 
social scientists have increasingly recognized that we “Humans” do not 
behave like Econs. Humans do not absorb all available information, and we 
process the information we do absorb in ways that are inconsistent or 
irrational. As a result, our choices are often influenced by the context in 
which questions are presented to us, even when the context conveys no 
relevant information. “Choice architecture,” including such seemingly 
irrelevant details as placement of an item in a buffet, prominence of a 
disclosure, or selection of the default option, can thus have a powerful 
impact on the choices that Humans make.2 
In Nudge, Cass R. Sunstein and coauthor Richard H. Thaler suggested 
that these observations created enormous opportunities for regulators. They 
introduced the concept of a “nudge”: an intervention that would have little 
impact on an Econ, but could change the behavior of a Human.3 A nudge, 
like a tailored disclosure or an altered default, could cause the Humans it 
touches to adopt different behaviors, including behaviors that advance 
Humans’ own interests. Thaler and Sunstein placed nudges at the center of 
a new regulatory philosophy, which they termed “libertarian paternalism.”4 
In their view, nudges were libertarian because they avoid heavy-handed 
penalties (which would not be nudges because of the impact they would 
have on an Econ) and thus preserve freedom of choice. And nudges could 
be used in a thoughtfully paternalistic fashion “to influence choices in a 
way that will make choosers better off, as judged by themselves.”5 
Sunstein and Thaler’s ideas have gained currency. Since Reagan, 
presidents have issued executive orders requiring certain new rules 
promulgated by administrative agencies to undergo a centralized review 
process focused on cost–benefit analysis.6 Among other innovations, 
President Obama’s version of the executive order called for consideration 
 
1  See RICHARD H. THALER & CASS R. SUNSTEIN, NUDGE: IMPROVING DECISIONS ABOUT HEALTH, 
WEALTH, AND HAPPINESS 6–7 (2d ed. 2009). 
2  Id. at 4–13. 
3  Id. at 8. 
4  Id. at 5. 
5  Id. 
6  See, e.g., Exec. Order No. 12,866, 3 C.F.R. 638, 639 (1994) (Clinton’s order stating “In deciding 
whether and how to regulate, agencies should assess all costs and benefits of available regulatory 
alternatives, including the alternative of not regulating”) [http://perma.cc/Y47M-2JC8]; Exec. Order 
No. 12,291, 3 C.F.R. 127 (1982) (Reagan’s order stating “Regulatory action shall not be undertaken 
unless the potential benefits to society for the regulation outweigh the potential costs to society”) 
[http://perma.cc/5K3Q-TFKG]. Reagan’s order had historical antecedents. See Jim Tozzi, OIRA’s 
Formative Years: The Historical Record of Centralized Regulatory Review Preceding OIRA’s 
Founding, 63 ADMIN. L. REV. (SPECIAL EDITION) 37, 40–62 (2011) (providing a history of regulatory 
review from President Johnson to President Carter) [http://perma.cc/29PF-MQ8Q]. 
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of nudges by requiring agencies to “identify and consider regulatory 
approaches that reduce burdens and maintain flexibility and freedom of 
choice for the public. These approaches include warnings, appropriate 
default rules, and disclosure requirements as well as provision of 
information to the public in a form that is clear and intelligible.”7 Sunstein 
himself worked to implement these ideas from a high level perch in the 
Obama Administration as the head of the Office of Information and 
Regulatory Affairs. 
Released shortly after his emergence from government service, Why 
Nudge? builds on Sunstein’s earlier ideas and works to justify them to a 
broader audience.8 Sunstein frames his argument as a response to John 
Stuart Mill’s famous Harm Principle: “government may not legitimately 
coerce people if its goal is to protect them from themselves.”9 Sunstein 
focuses on one justification for the Harm Principle, the “Epistemic 
Argument”: “[b]ecause individuals know their tastes and situations better 
than officials do, they are in the best position to identify their own ends and 
the best means of obtaining them.”10 He then attacks the Epistemic 
Argument, citing the type of behavioral findings discussed above.11 These 
findings suggest the existence of “behavioral market failures” in which 
individuals fail to maximize their own welfare.12 Like “standard market 
failures of the sort that support the most conventional roles of government, 
such as the provision of national defense, antitrust law, environmental 
protection, and a system of justice committed to the rule of law,” these 
behavioral market failures justify government action.13 
Sunstein then seeks to deepen his analysis by adding new dimensions 
to the concept of libertarian paternalism. He first develops the libertarian 
aspect, by distinguishing between “hard” and “soft” tools: “a statement that 
paternalism is ‘hard’ would mean that choice architects are imposing large 
 
7  Exec. Order No. 13,563, 3 C.F.R. 216 (2012) [http://perma.cc/J6VM-Y4DM]. The order also 
called for the analysis of “equity, human dignity, fairness, and distributive impacts.” Id. As this Review 
went to press, President Obama issued a directive supplementing Executive Order 13,563 and 
encouraging the use of insights from behavioral science in the regulatory process. Echoing Executive 
Order 13,563, the directive encouraged agencies to “improve how information is presented to 
consumers”; “identify programs that offer choices and carefully consider how the presentation and 
structure of those choices . . . can most effectively promote public welfare, as appropriate, giving 
particular consideration to the selection and setting of default options”; and “consider how the timing, 
frequency, presentation, and labeling of benefits, taxes, subsidies, and other incentives can more 
effectively and efficiently promote [specific] actions,” “such as saving for retirement or completing 
education programs.” Exec. Order No. 13,707, 80 Fed. Reg. 56, 365–66 (Sept. 15, 2015) 
[http://perma.cc/FDR2-VX3T]. 
8  CASS R. SUNSTEIN, WHY NUDGE?: THE POLITICS OF LIBERTARIAN PATERNALISM (2014) 
[hereinafter SUNSTEIN, WHY NUDGE?]. Why Nudge? is based on Sunstein’s Storrs Lecture at Yale Law 
School. See Cass R. Sunstein, The Storrs Lectures: Behavioral Economics and Paternalism, 122 YALE 
L.J. 1826 (2013) [http://perma.cc/5NHV-XZGF]. 
9  SUNSTEIN, WHY NUDGE?, supra note 8, at 3. 
10  Id. at 7. 
11  Id. at 25–50. 
12  Id. at 34. 
13  Id. at 115. 
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costs on choosers, whereas a statement that paternalism is ‘soft’ would 
mean that the costs are small.”14 He then develops the concept of 
paternalism by distinguishing between “means” paternalism and “ends” 
paternalism: ends paternalism seeks to dictate goals, while means 
paternalism seeks to aid people in pursuing the goals that they have chosen 
for themselves.15 Sunstein argues that paternalism that is soft16 and means-
oriented17 avoids the concerns that animate the Harm Principle. 
 
II. “IRRATIONAL” PREFERENCES 
Though a distinction between means and ends paternalism is 
attractive, it rapidly proves illusory. Sunstein recognizes that ends 
paternalism—telling people what their best interests are, not just how to 
pursue them—is especially troubling. He reassuringly asserts that 
“behavioral economists have not sought to revisit people’s ends, and their 
findings do not support ends paternalism.”18 But he immediately admits that 
the distinction raises “hard questions,”19 and ultimately reveals that it turns 
entirely on “the level of generality at which people’s ends are to be 
described.”20 If the end is described as a desire “for life to go well,” then all 
paternalism is means paternalism.21 
This in itself is troubling, since there is no ready formula for 
determining when an objective is stated with enough precision.22 And 
Sunstein exposes the flimsiness of the distinction by suggesting that when 
it is difficult to distinguish between means and ends, regulators should 
instead aim to “increase people’s aggregate welfare over time.”23 If there is 
a distinction between the end of maximizing “aggregate welfare over time” 
and having “life . . . go well,” it is not readily apparent. 
Even if the distinction between means and ends can be made to work 
in some instances, Sunstein himself acknowledges that it “may not be 
tractable”24 when individuals seem to have one preference (e.g., healthy 
living) but also others (e.g., cigarettes, whiskey, and peanut butter cookies). 
In other words, the distinction does not work when multiple, inconsistent 
sets of preferences can be inferred from a person’s choices. 
Of course, this is precisely the domain on which nudges operate: a 
 
14  Id. at 57. 
15  Id. at 61–63. 
16  Id. at 143. 
17  Id. at 157–59. 
18  Id. at 63. 
19  Id. 
20  Id. at 70. 
21  Id. 
22  Cf. John F. Manning, Nonlegislative Rules, 72 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 893, 911–13 (2004) 
(arguing that there is no judicially manageable standard for determining whether a statute or 
administrative rule has sufficient precision). 
23  SUNSTEIN, WHY NUDGE?, supra note 8, at 70. 
24  Id. 
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nudge can only work on a person who expresses different preferences in 
different contexts. It is also an expansive domain—multiple, inconsistent 
preferences are unavoidable in many situations where multiple factors are 
relevant to a choice, even if the chooser is fully informed and deliberative. 
Imagine a high school senior, Susan, who has applied to three 
colleges: Amherst, Bowdoin, and Carleton. While awaiting the results, 
Susan finalizes her research and begins to plan her decision in the event 
that she is accepted to more than one school. Based on the available 
information, she draws up the following rankings for the subject areas that 
interest her: 
 
Economics Political Science History 
1. Amherst 1. Bowdoin 1. Carleton 
2. Bowdoin 2. Carleton 2. Amherst 
3. Carleton 3. Amherst 3. Bowdoin 
 
She resolves that if she receives two acceptance letters, she will 
consult her rankings and discard the letter from the college that wins in 
fewer categories. For example, if she receives acceptance letters from 
Amherst and Bowdoin, she will note that Amherst outperforms Bowdoin in 
Economics and History, while Bowdoin outperforms only in Political 
Science. As a result, she will discard the letter from Bowdoin. 
She further resolves that if she receives a third letter, she will compare 
it to the surviving letter from the first two. So if she receives acceptance 
letters from Amherst and Bowdoin, and later Carleton, she will first discard 
the letter from Bowdoin as described above. Once the offer from Carleton 
arrives, she will compare it to the surviving offer from Amherst and apply 
the same analysis. Noting that Carleton outperforms Amherst in Political 
Science and History, while Amherst outperforms only in Economics, she 
will discard the letter from Amherst. 
Susan’s approach is not “irrational” in the colloquial sense. She has 
gathered and organized a broad range of information, synthesized it, and 
brought it to bear on a complex question. The resulting preferences are 
predictable, not random.25 It follows that Susan’s preferences are deserving 
of respect. 
 
25  The discussion in the text focuses on a type of procedural rationality. Susan followed a 
deliberative approach in making her decision. Susan’s decision is also substantively rational in the sense 
that any choice that she might make is defensible: each school has greater strength in ranking over the 
others in at least one area. Substantive and procedural reasonableness are distinct but related concepts. 
When a decisionmaker is faced with a broad range of reasonable options, reviewing courts often focus 
on the procedures that were used to make a selection. See Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm 
Mut. Auto. Ins., 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983) (explaining that courts evaluating agency action “may not 
supply a reasoned basis for the agency’s action,” even if one is available, but must instead evaluate the 
explanation given) [http://perma.cc/AQZ5-BQR4]; United States v. Ingram, 721 F.3d 35, 37–45 (2d 
Cir. 2013) (Calabresi, J., concurring) (highlighting a possible procedural issue in a criminal sentence 
while acknowledging that it was substantively reasonable, and noting that such procedural issues are 
material, partly for behavioral reasons) [http://perma.cc/8LN5-ERCP]. In other words, when a number 
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But Susan’s choices also have a curious quality. If she receives letters 
from Amherst and Bowdoin alone, she will choose Amherst. If she receives 
letters from Bowdoin and Carleton alone, she will choose Bowdoin. But if 
she receives letters from Amherst and Carleton, she will choose Carleton. It 
follows that if she receives acceptance letters from all three colleges, her 
ultimate choice will depend on the order in which the letters are received: If 
she receives letters from Amherst, then Bowdoin, then Carleton, for 
example, she will choose Carleton; if she receives letters from Bowdoin, 
then Carleton, then Amherst, she will choose Amherst; if she receives 
letters from Amherst, then Carleton, then Bowdoin, she will choose 
Bowdoin; and so on. Susan’s choice will depend on the context in which it 
is presented, even though the context conveys no relevant information. 
In other words, Susan is a Human, not an Econ, despite her careful 
collection and analysis of all available information, and despite her stable 
preferences. As discussed in greater detail below, this type of irrationality 
is an inevitable feature of decision processes like Susan’s. Indeed, it may 
be impossible to aggregate multiple factors in a way that avoids this type of 
irrationality.26 But Susan’s irrationality renders her susceptible to nudges. 
Suppose that Susan’s father Pat is aware of her approach to college 
selection. An Amherst graduate, Pat is convinced that deep down, Susan 
wants to attend Amherst because of the superior experience it offers. So 
when the letters arrive from Amherst, then Carleton, then Bowdoin (which 
would lead Susan to select Bowdoin), he surreptitiously intercepts them 
before Susan has an opportunity to collect them. While he is unwilling to 
actually destroy a letter or limit the choices available to Susan, he is willing 
to manipulate the context in which her choices are made. So he delivers the 
letters to Susan in a different order: Bowdoin, then Carleton, then Amherst. 
After receiving the letters in this order, Susan, predictably, selects Amherst. 
Pat might defend his actions by channeling Why Nudge? First, he 
might suggest that he had not meaningfully intervened in Susan’s decision. 
After all, “[c]hoice architecture is inevitable.”27 Every choice is made in a 
context, whether the context has been deliberately manipulated or not. 
 
of alternative choices are reasonable, review focuses on whether the choice was well-reasoned. A more 
deliberative and formal procedure can also persuade reviewing courts to accept decisions that would 
otherwise be seen as substantively unreasonable. See id. at 45 (“The closer a sentence comes to the 
boundary of the substantively reasonable, the more attentive will (and should) our procedural scrutiny 
be.”); Matthew C. Stephenson, The Strategic Substitution Effect: Textual Plausibility, Procedural 
Formality, and Judicial Review of Agency Statutory Interpretations, 120 HARV. L. REV. 528, 546–47 
(2006) (providing evidence “that the procedural formality of an agency decision can buy the agency 
more deference from the reviewing court”) [http://perma.cc/Q3GK-2U2E]. For Susan, the fact that there 
is no “wrong” choice on the selection of colleges implies that there is a need to focus on the manner in 
which her choice was made. If Susan somehow made an unusual or questionable choice, skepticism 
regarding her thought process would be natural. 
26  See infra notes 39 and 40 and accompanying text. This point has significant implications for the 
basic concept of nudging. A nudge is an intervention that has little to no consequence for an Econ. But 
certain types of preferences are not reconcilable through any process meeting basic desirable criteria. A 
person with such preferences would be affected by choice architecture, even if that person had the 
infinite intelligence and discipline of an Econ. 
27  SUNSTEIN, WHY NUDGE?, supra note 8, at 118. 
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Susan was going to receive the letters in one order or another, and her 
choice would be driven by that order. While Pat may have manipulated the 
choice architecture within which Susan made her decision, he did not 
impose costs on one choice or another. As a result, Pat may insist that 
Susan was free to make her own decision, and that the changed outcome 
was simply an expression of Susan’s own preferences. 
Second, Pat might assert that there had been no injury to Susan. It may 
be tempting to suggest that Susan does have an injury. If u(B) is the 
enjoyment or utility she would derive from selecting Bowdoin, and u(A) is 
the utility she would derive from Amherst, Pat’s manipulation resulted in a 
loss of utility of u(B) - u(A). But as shown above, there are circumstances 
under which Susan will choose Amherst despite having the option of 
choosing Bowdoin, suggesting that u(A) > u(B). Perhaps more strikingly, 
there are also circumstances under which Susan will choose Bowdoin 
despite having the option of choosing Amherst, suggesting that it is also 
true u(B) > u(A). Since these points cannot be reconciled, the only 
conclusion to be drawn is that Susan’s preferences cannot be distilled into a 
utility function, u(x), meaning that it is impossible to conceptualize an 
injury, u(B) - u(A). As a result, Pat might argue that his action did not harm 
Susan or invade her rights.28 
Pat’s first argument is more easily defeated than the second. The same 
logic that demonstrates the absence of an injury demonstrates that the 
outcome of Susan selecting Amherst is not an expression of an innate 
preference for Amherst. Under some circumstances, Susan will behave as if 
u(A) > u(B), but in others she will behave as if u(B) > u(A). As a result, Pat 
cannot defend his actions as merely facilitating some inner preference. The 
features of Susan’s decisionmaking process that render her susceptible to 
nudges defeat any such claim about her preferences. Thus, while Pat’s 
exercise of power is not coercive, it is an exercise of power. 
This point has resonance in the real world. In some contexts, an 
individual might say he wants to lose weight. In other contexts, he might 
say he wants peanut butter cookies. While a government official may 
choose to encourage the former preference instead of the latter, it is a 
choice made by the government official.29 Sunstein tries to present nudging 
 
28  Of course, Susan did receive the letters later than she otherwise would have. But this relatively 
minor injury does not seem to get at the gravamen of Pat’s offense. It may also be possible to suggest 
that Susan has a right to a manipulation-free choice of colleges. If it is assumed that Susan has such a 
right, then it is trivially easy to conclude that nudges like Pat’s are improper. Sunstein appears to 
concede as much when he acknowledges that a “thick” conception of autonomy “is, in a sense, a show-
stopper. If people have to be treated as ends rather than as mere means, and if this principle requires 
government not to influence private choices on paternalistic grounds, there is not a lot of room for 
further discussion.” SUNSTEIN, WHY NUDGE?, supra note 8, at 133. 
29  The basic point that nudging requires the government to adopt its own vision of ideal outcomes 
is not new. See, e.g., Gregory Mitchell, Libertarian Paternalism Is an Oxymoron, 99 NW. U. L. REV. 
1245, 1269 (2005) (“Sunstein and Thaler’s welfarist approach will inevitably result in the imposition of 
some conception of welfare on irrational people that some subset would surely find objectionable under 
conditions that permit rational evaluation.”) [http://perma.cc/DYC9-PDSX]. 
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as facilitating a person’s own true preferences. But a government official 
who nudges has made a decision of her own for her own reasons, and that 
decision must be defended on its own terms. 
 
III. ENUMERATED POWERS 
It is more difficult to counter the other argument in Part II that Pat did 
nothing wrong because he did not injure Susan or invade her rights. But a 
response might be found by shifting the focus from Susan’s rights to Pat’s 
power. Even though it would be difficult to criticize Pat’s behavior by 
urging that Susan had a right to attend Bowdoin or that it was infringed 
upon, it might be possible to criticize Pat’s behavior by asking what 
entitled him to exercise power in the first place. In sum, there is a 
conceptual basis for criticizing an exercise of power that does not turn on 
an identifiable injury or invasion of an individual’s rights. To concede that 
Susan was not “injured” by Pat’s actions in any traditional sense is not to 
concede that Pat was entitled to act as he did. 
The point resonates with the American conception of government as a 
creature of limited, designated powers. The Constitution creates a federal 
government, but authorizes it to act only in specifically enumerated areas.30 
The federal government is not empowered to act in any way it chooses, 
subject only to the requirement that it must not invade individual rights. 
Even where a federal statute does not invade a right belonging to an 
individual, it can still be improper because it exceeds the powers granted to 
Congress.31 
The realm of speech and conscience offers a key example. Though 
often cast as a right to speak and worship freely, the text of the First 
Amendment is framed as a denial of power,32 and this textual framing 
corresponds precisely to the amendment’s historical intellectual context, in 
which speech and religion were deemed outside the limited and enumerated 
powers of the federal government.33 Put differently, the First Amendment 
 
30  See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, art. III, § 2 [http://perma.cc/K2B6-GNRA]. 
31  See, e.g., United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 602 (2000) (concluding that provisions of the 
Violence Against Women Act of 1994 exceeded Congress’s power under the Commerce Clause and 
Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment) [http://perma.cc/WWE3-ABJJ]; United States v. Lopez, 514 
U.S. 549, 552 (1995) (concluding that a provision of the Gun-Free School Zones Act of 1990 exceeded 
Congress’s power under the Commerce Clause) [http://perma.cc/P3Y2-LBXG]. 
32  See U.S. CONST. amend. I (“Congress shall make no law . . . .”); AKHIL REED AMAR, THE BILL 
OF RIGHTS: CREATION AND RECONSTRUCTION 39 (1998) (noting textual parallel between First 
Amendment and clauses conferring power on Congress). 
33  AMAR, supra note 32, at 35–42; see also Noah Feldman, The Intellectual Origins of the 
Establishment Clause, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 346, 369–71 (2002) (describing Locke’s view that individuals 
could not delegate to the government authority over matters of conscience) [http://perma.cc/4ARW-
W5VK]. For a time, courts sought to express the essentially power-based norms of the First 
Amendment in terms of individual rights that are appropriate for judicial enforcement. See Lynch v. 
Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 687–88 (1984) (O’Connor, J., concurring) (recasting the government’s lack of 
legitimate power to establish a religion as a right of nonadherents not to feel excluded from the political 
community in order to permit judicial enforcement of the Establishment Clause in the context of 
challenge to Christmas decorations) [http://perma.cc/DE6F-VJVA]; Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 88, 
106 (1968) (recognizing taxpayers are injured by, and thus have standing to challenge, use of 
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captures the sense that the American social contract does not delegate to 
the government power over matters of the mind and soul. 
This framing would have been familiar to John Stuart Mill, who also 
framed the issue in terms of authority and power: “Those who desire to 
suppress” an opinion “of course deny its truth; but they are not infallible. 
They have no authority to decide the question for all mankind, and exclude 
every other person from the means of judging.”34 His Harm Principle more 
generally fits this model: “[T]he only purpose for which power can be 
rightfully exercised over any member of a civilized community, against his 
will, is to prevent harm to others.”35 
Similarly, critics of nudges rarely speak to the (often questionable) 
individual rights at stake, and instead discuss the proper role of 
government. It would be difficult to attack New York City Mayor Michael 
Bloomberg’s attempt to ban large soda cups on the ground that there is an 
inalienable natural right to receive a large amount of soda in one very big 
cup instead of two somewhat big cups.36 But the charge that the restriction 
went beyond the proper role of government and amounted to “nannying” 
resonates. Whatever its failings as a descriptive matter, the maxim de 
minimis non curat lex—the law does not concern itself with trifles—is a 
reasonable slogan for lawmakers. This is not because individuals have 
profound natural rights with respect to trifling matters, but rather because 
the state should think twice before intervening in such issues.37 
 
IV. SEPARATION OF POWERS 
And of course, the government’s decisions are often no better than 
those of the individuals it regulates. Legislatures in particular are 
structurally predisposed toward the same type of irrationality as Susan. As 
a result, to even attempt to avoid the irrationality endemic to individuals, 
governments must adopt troubling structural measures that shift power 
from legislatures to executives. 
The analogy between legislative and individual irrationality can be 
made clear by means of a hypothetical. Consider a committee of three 
senators deliberating on the location of a government facility. After 
 
government funds on religious schools) [http://perma.cc/E6XP-LT42]. These holdings have come under 
continuous pressure since. See Ariz. Christian Sch. Tuition Org. v. Winn, 131 S. Ct. 1436, 1447–1449 
(2011) (distinguishing between use of government funds, which create standing to press Establishment 
Clause claims in federal court, and tax credits, which do not) [http://perma.cc/S3LN-7SJT]; Hein v. 
Freedom from Religion Found., Inc., 551 U.S. 587, 593 (2007) (noting that taxpayers do not have 
standing to challenge executive action on Establishment Clause grounds) [http://perma.cc/3A7R-RP3S]. 
34  JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY 88 (David Bromwich & George Kateb eds., Yale Univ. Press 
2003) (1859) (emphasis added). 
35  Id. at 80. 
36  Cf. SUNSTEIN, WHY NUDGE?, supra note 8, at 75–80. 
37  The point has a clear economic rationale as well. See JOHN MICKLETHWAIT & ADRIAN 
WOOLDRIDGE, THE FOURTH REVOLUTION: THE GLOBAL RACE TO REINVENT THE STATE 47–56 (2014) 
(characterizing Mill’s work as part of Victorian England’s reinvention of the state into a more focused 
and efficient entity). 
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narrowing the possibilities down to Austin, Boston, and Chicago, the 
senators each decide on their preferences: 
 
Sen. Jones Sen. Smith Sen. Williams 
1. Austin 1. Boston 1. Chicago 
2. Boston 2. Chicago 2. Austin 
3. Chicago 3. Austin 3. Boston 
 
On this committee, there will be two votes for Austin over Boston, 
two votes for Boston over Chicago, and two votes for Chicago over Austin. 
As a result of this cyclicality, the committee’s ultimate choice will depend 
entirely on the sequence in which votes are held. 
In the context of voting, this toy example becomes more familiar. It is 
simply an application of Condorcet’s paradox: even simple voting systems 
have in them the potential for cyclical, and thus irrational, preferences.38 
Modern social choice economics has broadened the observation, 
mathematically proving that it is impossible to create voting systems that 
yield rational decisions under a wide range of circumstances.39 The only 
system that can consistently avoid this type of problem is a system in which 
only one individual’s preferences are material to the decisions made.40 
And that’s if every legislator were fully rational and well-informed. 
The truth is far worse. As Sunstein acknowledges, “elected officials, 
including those in Congress, may or may not be relying on careful 
analysis . . . . [T]heir own intuitive reactions, and those of their 
constituents, drive judgments about policy and even legislation.”41 The 
 
38  See Amartya Sen, Arrow and the Impossibility Theorem, in THE ARROW IMPOSSIBILITY 
THEOREM 29, 33–34 (Eric Maskin & Amartya Sen eds., 2014); Partha Dasgupta & Eric Maskin, On the 
Robustness of Majority Rule, in THE ARROW IMPOSSIBILITY THEOREM, supra at 101, 104–05 
(describing and illustrating Condorcet’s paradox). 
39  Sen, supra note 38, at 33–34 (explaining Arrow’s theorem as a generalization of Condorcet’s 
paradox). 
40  Better results can be obtained if preferences are assumed to be “single-peaked,” meaning that 
each individual’s preferences have a single local maximum, and utility decreases as choices move away 
in any direction from that peak. In that situation, the majority will consistently favor the preferences of 
the “median voter.” These conditions may prevail in certain contexts. See FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & 
DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF CORPORATE LAW 70 (1991) (arguing that 
corporate voting rights should be limited to shareholders because they are likely to have similar 
preferences, thus leading to consistent corporate policies). But they are unlikely to prevail on issues of 
public policy, particularly on multidimensional problems. See Keith Krehbiel, Legislative Organization, 
18 J. ECON. PERSP. 113, 114–15 (2004) [http://perma.cc/79CF-9AH5]. 
41  SUNSTEIN, WHY NUDGE?, supra note 8, at 121. Of course, legislators are free to adopt the same 
analytical techniques relied upon by executive offices. Many federal legislators have expressed a desire 
to do so. See generally MONEYBALL FOR GOVERNMENT (Jim Nussle & Peter Orszag eds., 2014) (essays 
by several prominent political figures, including two sitting senators, on the application of rigorous 
effectiveness analysis to legislative and regulatory work). While this desire is commendable, debates 
over analytical methods appear to be no less controversial than debates over policy. See Josh Zumbrun, 
White House Budget Director Blasts GOP ‘Dynamic Scoring’ Plans, WALL ST. J. (Jan. 6, 2015, 4:40 
PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/economics/2015/01/06/white-house-budget-director-blasts-gop-dynamic-
scoring-plans (describing contentious debate over Republican plan to change the methods used to 
estimate cost of fiscal measures) [http://perma.cc/T99Q-493G]. There is little reason to believe that a 
durable consensus on such issues will form, or that it will trump partisan or political preferences on 
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point is confirmed elsewhere in Sunstein’s work. Why Nudge? is part of a 
loose OIRA trilogy: a series of three books produced by Cass Sunstein 
shortly after his service as Administrator of the Office of Information and 
Regulatory Affairs (OIRA), and inspired by his work there.42 OIRA is an 
executive office, and once Sunstein was safely ensconced in it, he was 
insulated from “sewer talk”: the kind of crass and illogical political 
considerations that drive the passage of legislation.43 But before he was 
confirmed to the office, he had to deal with actual legislators. In eight 
pages of Simpler, he describes the time prior to his confirmation as a 
surreal experience in which he was subjected to hyperbolic claims from the 
left and the right, and met with senators who agreed that he would be an 
excellent choice but refused to vote for him.44 
The net result is that multimember legislatures cannot be expected to 
have fully rational policy preferences. Actual legislators are often 
irrational. And even under ideal circumstances in which every individual 
legislator is fully rational and well-informed, the work product of the 
legislature as a whole would be characterized by messy compromises, 
forged as a result of circumstances that should have no real relevance to 
good policy. 
As a result, government can only improve upon the rationality of its 
citizens by adopting an institutional framework that deemphasizes the 
legislature. Congress can make broad delegations of authority to the 
President, who can then adopt a disciplined approach that ensures that 
policies are developed in a rational and orderly fashion. As the cockpit of 
the administrative state, OIRA is the institutional embodiment of this 
solution. Pursuant to a series of executive orders that generally direct the 
use of cost–benefit analysis, OIRA guides regulatory agencies in the 
reasoned use of their essentially open-ended grants of authority from 
Congress. Sunstein’s optimistic view of the capacity of government to 
improve upon citizens’ decisions seems to be informed by his experience 
within the executive as the head of OIRA. He assures readers that “[w]ithin 
the executive branch in the U.S. government, the long-standing requirement 
of attention to costs and benefits can produce . . . a safeguard against 
serious mistakes.”45 Elsewhere, he writes that “consideration of ‘politics’ is 
not a significant part of OIRA’s own role.”46 
 
particular policies. 
42  See CASS R. SUNSTEIN, VALUING LIFE: HUMANIZING THE REGULATORY STATE (2014) 
[hereinafter SUNSTEIN, VALUING LIFE]; CASS R. SUNSTEIN, SIMPLER: THE FUTURE OF GOVERNMENT 
(2013) [hereinafter SUNSTEIN, SIMPLER]. 
43  SUNSTEIN, SIMPLER, supra note 42, at 4–6 (stating that he would gently tell staffers who focused 
on political concerns, “That’s sewer talk. Get your mind out of the gutter.”); see also SUNSTEIN, 
VALUING LIFE, supra note 42, at 6 (“[M]y role was to help implement the law through regulations 
and . . . I was usually not involved in the enactment of legislation by Congress.”). 
44  SUNSTEIN, SIMPLER, supra note 42, at 18–26. 
45  SUNSTEIN, WHY NUDGE?, supra note 8, at 120–21 (emphasis added). 
46  SUNSTEIN, VALUING LIFE, supra note 42, at 44. 
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Even assuming that OIRA does its work well, this institutional context 
is troubling. OIRA technocrats escape the irrational results created by 
voting and from the “sewer talk” of the political process only because their 
work is largely insulated from democratic accountability. OIRA can guide 
executive agencies toward rational rules only because Congress has cut 
itself out of the process by which these legally binding rules are made.47 
The substantive weight of this rulemaking is undeniable. Much executive 
rulemaking is true lawmaking, in the sense that it is the agency’s rule that 
makes conduct unlawful, not any statute enacted by Congress.48 Sunstein 
himself also emphasizes how enormously consequential these rules can be 
when he claims that the regulatory work overseen by OIRA during the 
early years of the Obama Administration created annual benefits of $91.3 
billion in inflation-adjusted dollars.49 Few statutes have consequences 
anywhere near that order of magnitude. The institutional context that 
inspired Sunstein’s optimism thus fits uncomfortably with separation of 
powers values. 
The point should not be carried too far. The administrative state is 
here to stay, and that’s a good thing (for the most part, anyway). But 
Sunstein’s implicit efforts to address it are unpersuasive, particularly with 
 
47  Perhaps more troublingly, some have argued that OIRA’s involvement in squelching particular 
agency rules has actually subverted clear statutory commands from Congress. The congressionally 
enacted Clean Air Act requires that national ambient air quality standards be based on public health 
instead of cost–benefit analysis. See Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, 531 U.S. 457, 471 (2001) 
[http://perma.cc/L48T-GUQG]. As the head of OIRA, Sunstein wrote a letter that had the effect of 
postponing an effort by the Environmental Protection Agency to set standards on ozone emissions. 
While commentators focused their criticism on the seemingly political nature of the decision (the delay 
put off the controversial rule until after the 2012 presidential election), it is also striking that Sunstein’s 
own justification seems to be based on the costs of compliance. See Cass R. Sunstein, The Backstory of 
Obama’s Ozone Rules, BLOOMBERG VIEW (Dec. 3, 2014, 4:00 PM), http://www.bloombergview.com/ 
articles/2014-12-03/the-backstory-of-obamas-ozone-rules [http://perma.cc/J7NB-PK8A]. 
 Sunstein himself has acknowledged the concern that OIRA’s involvement in the regulatory process 
accords significant authority to the President, as opposed to the agencies that Congress intended to 
empower. See Cass R. Sunstein, Cost–Benefit Analysis and the Separation of Powers, 23 ARIZ. L. REV. 
1267 (1981). But see Michael A. Livermore, Cost–Benefit Analysis and Agency Independence, 81 U. 
CHI. L. REV. 609 (2014) (arguing for a more nuanced understanding of the effect of OIRA’s cost–
benefit analysis) [http://perma.cc/S4ZQ-SQEL]. 
 Admittedly, Congress can limit presidential control by delegating power to “independent” agencies, 
which enjoy some measure of insulation from OIRA interference. See Cass R. Sunstein, Financial 
Regulation and Cost–Benefit Analysis, 124 YALE L.J. F. 263, 268 and n.25 (2015), 
http://www.yalelawjournal.org/forum/financial-regulation-and-cost-benefit-analysis (noting that OIRA 
process does not apply to independent agencies, and has not been applied to rules from the Internal 
Revenue Service) [http://perma.cc/7C7T-YK7F]. Congress can also mandate that these agencies 
achieve the same substantive results by requiring that the agencies conduct a cost–benefit analysis for 
any new rule, and by exposing that analysis to judicial review. Business Roundtable v. SEC, 647 F.3d 
1144, 1148–49 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (applying searching review of agency cost–benefit analysis) 
[http://perma.cc/W57N-4M72]. But while these measures would limit presidential interference, they 
would do little to shift lawmaking authority back to Congress. 
48  See Aneil Kovvali, Note, Seminole Rock and the Separation of Powers, 36 HARV. J.L. & PUB. 
POL’Y 849, 854–55 (2013) (observing that many statutes do not create binding norms, but rather 
empower administrative agencies to create them) [http://perma.cc/4PS2-ZKZT]. 
49  SUNSTEIN, SIMPLER, supra note 42, at 34. The quantification of costs and benefits is the central 
theme of VALUING LIFE, supra note 42. OIRA’s efforts to formalize and improve upon cost–benefit 
analysis do open up new avenues of congressional control. Congress could insist that the total cost of all 
rules administered by an agency in a given year must not exceed a set sum. 
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respect to nudging. 
Sunstein emphasizes a norm of “government by discussion”: a 
principle that the regulatory process should solicit and incorporate a wide 
variety of views.50 By incorporating widely dispersed information and 
analysis of alternatives, the norm encourages regulators to replicate the 
results of the legislative process at its best.51 To the extent that the 
constitutionally prescribed lawmaking process is simply designed to 
improve the quality of decisions—a view Sunstein appears to endorse52—
government by discussion is a viable substitute. But legitimacy is not 
simply about the quality of decisions—it is about the decisionmakers 
themselves. A choice by an isolated technocrat cannot have the same moral 
force as votes cast by elected officials. In addition, many foundational 
values of our government find expression in the institutional structure of 
Congress. For example, the Constitution does not always guarantee 
federalism-respecting results, but rather a federalism-respecting process in 
which the specially constructed Senate safeguards the interests of 
individual states.53 While executive orders can encourage administrative 
agencies to achieve federalism-respecting results,54 they are not in step with 
the inherently procedural nature of the guarantee. 
Aside from applying the concept of government by discussion, 
Sunstein suggests that government can be directly responsive to the 
concerns of citizens by designing regulations that are tailored to their 
preferences. For example, Sunstein notes that citizens appear to fear death 
from cancer more than death from other causes, and will incur greater costs 
in order to avoid it.55 He suggests that on certain assumptions, it may be 
appropriate for government to respect the special strength of this concern 
when designing regulations.56 
If fully accepted, this framing would have broad implications. 
Americans have a deep fear of tyranny—one that commentators have 
likened to a fear of cancer in the sense that it causes Americans to take 
 
50  SUNSTEIN, VALUING LIFE, supra note 42, at 14–15. The phrase is drawn from the work of 
Amartya Sen. 
51  Id. at 45–46. This concept is also reflected in the Administrative Procedure Act, which generally 
directs that agencies afford notice and consider public comments before promulgating legislative rules. 
See 5 U.S.C. § 553 (2012) [http://perma.cc/JY5Y-KETN]. This statutory requirement is limited in 
scope, and agencies can evade it by reinterpreting existing rules in novel ways to achieve new 
regulatory outcomes. Their evasions bode ill for Sunstein’s government-by-discussion norm. 
52  See SUNSTEIN, WHY NUDGE?, supra note 8, at 121. 
53  See Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 551–53 (1985) (concluding that 
state and local governments are protected by the federalism-respecting structure of Congress, instead of 
specific rules on the appropriate scope of federal regulation) [http://perma.cc/U4QV-ZNKA]. 
54  Beginning with the Reagan Administration, executive orders have required agencies to consider 
certain federalism implications of rules. See Exec. Order No. 12,612, 3 C.F.R. 252–56 (1988) 
[http://perma.cc/ZTD4-5R2F]. 
55  SUNSTEIN, VALUING LIFE, supra note 42, at 97–101. 
56  Id. at 101 (asserting that respect for autonomy may lead regulators to accept citizens’ concerns, 
but would not require regulators to do so if those concerns are uninformed). 
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unusually costly precautions.57 Unlike many of the “preferences” that 
Sunstein seeks to encourage, Americans have demonstrated the seriousness 
of their intent to avoid despotism by adopting a hugely expensive 
institutional structure in which powers are separated. And they adopted this 
structure through a process that demanded seriousness of intent, namely the 
ratification process in Article VII of the Constitution. The risks addressed 
by this structure may seem remote, and any individual regulation may have 
only a miniscule marginal impact on the likelihood of their realization. But 
Sunstein has indicated that this type of risk cannot be ignored. Global 
warming’s costs will not be fully realized for decades, and any individual 
ton of carbon will have only a miniscule impact on the problem. But 
Sunstein supported both the estimation of a “social cost of carbon,” and its 
use in evaluating the benefits of carbon-reducing regulation. Applying this 
outlook to administrative rulemaking would lead to serious skepticism of 
the executive lawmaking involved. 
 
V. PREFERENCES REVISITED 
Less abstractly, the justification that the government can tailor 
regulations to individual preferences depends on the government’s ability 
to discern citizens’ preferences and to advance them with greater success 
than citizens themselves. While there are contexts in which this is 
plausible, nudging falls into a somewhat different category. 
Nudges are only effective where a person’s choices do not reveal a 
consistent preference for one outcome over another. Pat can “nudge” Susan 
from Bowdoin to Amherst only because there are circumstances under 
which she will choose Bowdoin and circumstances under which she will 
choose Amherst. Pat is not facilitating a hidden preference for Amherst 
over Bowdoin; Pat is advancing a preference for Amherst instead of a 
preference for Bowdoin for Pat’s own reasons. 
In the realm of public policy, such reasons can be quite powerful. 
When citizens have contradictory preferences—for healthy living and 
peanut butter cookies, for example—the government might reasonably 
choose to advance the preference that avoids social ills.58 In the midst of an 
obesity epidemic with profound societal consequences, nudging a citizen 
away from cookies might be justified on the ground that it avoids harm to 
others. But it cannot be justified on the ground that it is what the citizen 
himself wants. The grounds for privileging a preference for healthy living 
 
57  See ERIC A. POSNER & ADRIAN VERMEULE, THE EXECUTIVE UNBOUND: AFTER THE 
MADISONIAN REPUBLIC 193 (2010). 
58 Along these lines, President Obama’s executive order of September 15, 2015 wisely emphasized 
public rather than private rationales, encouraging agencies to deploy behavioral science insights to 
improve “public welfare, program outcomes, and program cost effectiveness;” and stating that 
“behavioral science insights can support a range of national priorities, including helping workers to 
find better jobs; enabling Americans to lead longer, healthier lives; improving access to educational 
opportunities and support for success in school; and accelerating the transition to a low-carbon 
economy.” Exec. Order No. 13,707, 80 Fed. Reg. 56,365 (Sept. 15, 2015) (emphasis added). 
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over a preference for cookies are extrinsic to the citizen. 
Nudging is uniquely vulnerable to this line of attack. Other policy 
innovations have also garnered attention in recent years. President Obama’s 
2011 order governing the review of new regulations introduced explicit 
calls for the analysis of “equity, human dignity, fairness, and distributive 
impacts.”59 But such considerations can be justified quite easily by 
reference to the limits of private ordering. While private individuals and 
entities have a profound ability to organize themselves to reach desirable 
outcomes, issues of equity, fairness, and distributive impacts can call for 
government intervention. 
The work of Ronald Coase provides a useful framework for this point. 
Suppose that a doctor builds an office next door to a food manufacturer.60 If 
the manufacturer runs his machines, they will create noise and vibrations 
that will make it impossible for the doctor to practice medicine in her 
office. If the doctor is successful in forcing the manufacturer to provide the 
peace and quiet needed to practice medicine, the manufacturer will be 
unable to produce food. From this situation, Coase drew two powerful 
insights. 
First, any harm is reciprocal.61 It is possible to argue that the 
manufacturer’s noise is interfering with the doctor’s work, but it is also 
possible to argue that the doctor’s demand for quiet is interfering with the 
manufacturer’s work. 
Second, if the costs of a transaction are low enough, the doctor and 
manufacturer will arrive at an efficient outcome regardless of which one 
the law favors.62 If the doctor would create more value with a right to quiet 
than the manufacturer would with a right to make noise, but the law 
favored the manufacturer, the doctor would pay the manufacturer to 
abstain. This conclusion, now known as “Coase’s Theorem,” suggests that 
private individuals can organize themselves to achieve efficient outcomes, 
at least where transaction costs are manageable. 
But even if bargaining were cheap, the “distributive impacts” of a 
regulation would remain relevant. If the doctor lacks the cash to pay the 
manufacturer to desist, the manufacturer may end up running his machines, 
thus destroying value. Admittedly, if transaction costs were zero, the doctor 
could borrow against the future value of practicing medicine. But the 
prevention of harms to human dignity will not result in new cash flows that 
can be borrowed against. As a result, such harms will only be prevented if 
the person impacted is already wealthy enough to pay the necessary bribes. 
 
59  Exec. Order 13,563, 3 C.F.R. 216 (2012). 
60  This example is drawn from Sturges v. Bridgman, (1879) 11 Ch.D. 852 (Eng.), which Coase 
analyzed in his famous essay, “The Problem of Social Cost.” See R.H. Coase, The Problem of Social 
Cost, in THE FIRM, THE MARKET, AND THE LAW 95, 105–07 (1988). 
61  Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, supra note 60, at 96. 
62  Id. at 105–07. 
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Here, regulatory consideration of “human dignity” is necessary, and 
interacts with the need to consider “distributive impacts.”63 
As a result, when regulators base their decisions on distributive 
impacts or human dignity concerns, they are acting on a justifiable 
suspicion that the behaviors observed in the real world do not reflect real 
underlying preferences. As demonstrated above, the same cannot be said 
when regulators respond to “behavioral market failures.”64 
Coasean reasoning also supports regulatory policy in a different way, 
since it is built on the insight that “harm” is a flexible concept.65 The 
regulatory state has been built on a series of broadening observations about 
the nature of harm, as government actors realized that conduct which 
seemed harmless actually wrought harm on a broad set of individuals. 
The point relates to the enumerated powers analogy developed above. 
The federal government has power only over specific areas, such as 
interstate commerce. In a classic case, the Supreme Court held that this 
power extended to a farmer’s decision to grow wheat for personal use, 
innovatively reasoning that, when it was understood in the context of a 
complex market, the farmer’s seemingly isolated acts contributed to the 
harms wrought by excess supply.66 Similarly, obedience to the Harm 
Principle as an appropriate limit on government does not require 
commitment to an unduly narrow vision of harm that ignores the complex 
consequences of behavior. 
The point applies directly to some of the examples of good policy 
used by Sunstein. Sunstein touts straightforward disclosure requirements 
for products, including labels for cars that clearly disclose their level of fuel 
efficiency67 or labels for cigarettes disclosing risks.68 But selling a product 
without adequate disclosure of its costly failings can be seen as a harmful 
activity. Standardization of the required disclosure can also be understood 
 
63  Exec. Order 13,563, 3 C.F.R. 216 (2012). 
64  See supra Part II. 
65  In his other writings, Sunstein has made the same basic point. Article III of the Constitution 
limits federal courts to consideration of genuine cases or controversies, a requirement that federal courts 
have held requires plaintiffs to have suffered an actual injury. Sunstein has suggested that judicial 
efforts to enforce this requirement by denying claims of injury are based largely on contestable 
assumptions: 
In classifying some harms as injuries in fact and other harms as purely ideological, courts must 
inevitably rely on some standard that is normatively laden and independent of facts. . . . When 
blacks challenge a grant of tax deductions to segregated schools, they believe that the grant is 
an injury in fact, not that it is purely ideological. When an environmentalist complains about 
the destruction of a pristine area, he believes that the loss of that area is indeed an injury to him. 
When we deny these claims, we are making a judgment based not on any fact, but instead on an 
inquiry into what should count as a judicially cognizable injury. 
Cass R. Sunstein, What’s Standing After Lujan? Of Citizen Suits, “Injuries,” and Article III, 91 MICH. 
L. REV. 163, 188–90 (1992) (citations omitted). Courts have shown some willingness to reinvent 
Article III concepts of harm, though such changes are often controversial, or narrowly limited by later 
rulings. See supra note 33. 
66  Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 127–29 (1942) [http://perma.cc/623D-3KPJ]. 
67  See SUNSTEIN, WHY NUDGE?, supra note 8, at 65–67. 
68  See id. at 120. 
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as a way to prevent the sellers of goods from imposing information 
processing costs on consumers.69 Sunstein himself develops more unusual 
concepts of harm, noting that a decision not to wear a seatbelt has an 
impact on the social costs of wearing a seatbelt for others by delaying the 
change in the social meaning of seatbelt wearing from “cowardice” to 
“prudence.”70 Since a decision not to wear a seatbelt can cause this type of 
harm to others, a rule requiring its use would be justifiable even under the 
Harm Principle.71 In sum, even if such policies seem salutary or 




To borrow Sunstein’s terminology, behavioral insights may be more 
persuasive when brought to bear on governmental means rather than ends. 
Behavioral insights might be useful to regulators as they decide how to 
structure rules that are effective and place minimal burdens on those who 
are bound. But it is troubling when they are offered up as a reason why 
regulation is needed. When regulators violate the Harm Principle, they 
inevitably impose their own preferences, instead of advancing the 
preferences of the citizens who are bound. Even if this does not result in a 
clear injury, it exceeds typical understandings about the reach of 
government power, and requires a problematic institutional structure. 
Given the flexibility of the Harm Principle and the broad governmental role 
it authorizes, there is little reason to abandon it. 
 
 
69  Many legal rules can be justified by this type of harm. See generally Thomas W. Merrill & 
Henry E. Smith, Optimal Standardization in the Law of Property: The Numerus Clausus Principle, 
110 YALE L.J. 1 (2000) (suggesting that doctrines that limit variation in property interests control third 
party information costs) [http://perma.cc/48Z4-63BX]. 
70  SUNSTEIN, WHY NUDGE?, supra note 8, at 60. 
71  This is particularly true if the rule or its enforcement is tailored to the harm. For example, a 
temporary rule that expires once the social norm has had a chance to take hold, or a rule that is not 
harshly enforced (so that its primary force is moral or normative instead of coercive), would be 
precisely addressed to the harm. See Tom Ginsburg, Jonathan S. Masur & Richard H. McAdams, 
Libertarian Paternalism, Path Dependence, and Temporary Law, 81 U. CHI. L. REV. 291, 347–48 
(2014) (suggesting that a temporary seat belt regulation could change the social meaning of seat belt 
usage, thus addressing this type of harm with minimal imposition on freedom) [http://perma.cc/344M-
KXSE]. 
